How properties hold together in Substances by E. Earley, Joseph
Essays in the Philosophy 
of Chemistry 




ERIC SCERRI AND GRANT FISHER 
The chapter by Joseph E. Earley Sr. (chap. 10) can only be described as a tour 
de force in every sense of the term. Earley's writing, perhaps more than that of 
any other currently active author, displays a complete mastery of both the phil­
osophical and the chemical literature. Nothing that could be said briefly here 
would do justice to his essay, which ranges across a diverse set of topics in­
cluding the nature of substance, properties and relations, bundles, molecular 
properties, onticity, wholes and parts and much more. 
CHAPTER 10 / How Properties Hold Together 
in Substances 
TOSEPH E. EARLEY, SR. 
1 What Has Chemistry to Do with Philosophy? 
A main aim of chemical research is to understand how the characteristic proper­
ties of specific chemical substances relate to the composition and to the strncture of 
those materials. Such investigations assume a broad consensus regarding basic 
aspects of chemistry. Philosophers generally regard widespread agreement on 
basic. principles as a remote goal, not something already achieved. They do not 
agree on how properties stay together in ordinary objects. Some follow John 
Locke [1632-1704] and maintain that properties of entities inhere in substrates. The 
item that this approach considers to underlie characteristics is often called "a bare 
particular" (Sider 2006). However, others reject this understanding and hold that 
substances are bundles of properties-an approach advocated by David Hume 
[r7rr-1776J. Some supporters of Hume's theory hold that entities are collec­
tions of"tropes" (property-instances) held together in a "compresence relation­
ship" (Simons 1994). Recently several authors have pointed out the importance 
of "structures" for the coherence of substances, but serious questions have been 
raised about those proposals. Philosophers generally use a time-independent 
(synchronic} approach and do not consider how chemists understand proper­
ties of chemical substances and of dynamic networks of chemical reactions. 
This chapter aims to clarify how current chemical understanding relates to 
aspects of contemporary philosophy. The first section introduces philosophical 
debates, the second considers properties of chemical systems, the third part 
deals with theories of wholes and parts, the fourth segment argues that closure 
grounds properties of coherences, the fifth section introduces structural realism 
(SR}, the sixth part considers contextual emergence and concludes that dynamic 
structures of processes may qualify as determinants ("causes") of specific out­
comes, and the final section suggests that ordinary items are based on closure 
of relationships among constituents additionally determined by selection for 
integration into more-extensive coherences. \ 
1.1 Substances
Ruth Garrett Millikan discussed the concept of substance in philosophy:
Substances
. are whatever one can learn from given only one or a few encounters, various skills or information that will appiy to other encounters,.
. Further,this possibility must be grounded in some kind of natural necessity,.. .The function of a substance concept is to make possible this sort of learning and use ofknowledge for a specific substance,
Substances necessarily persist through time and thus are distinguished fromevents. Chemists, however, define chemical substances as materials of constant composition and definite properties—and also consider all systems tobe composed of smaller items. They hold that macroscopic samples are madeup of molecules and that molecules have atomic nuclei and electrons as components. All of these bits are in incessant motion, and in continual interaction with other items. The long-term stability of composite chemical entitiesimplies that internal motions are somehow constrained so that the compositesretain integrity over time and through interaction. Paul Weiss described thissituation in terms of the philosophers’ concept of substance:
Each actuality is a substance. It maintains a hold on whatever it contains, produces, and intrudes upon. It persists and it acts. It has an irreducible, independent core, and receives determinaons from insistent, intrusive forces... . If anactuality were not a substance, its parts would not belong to it, and it would disperse itself in the very act of making its presence evident. The very items whichit dominates, it would not control; nor would it continue 10 be despite an involvement in change and motion. It would be inert and solely in itself or it would bea mere event. In either case, it would not be a source of action.
The well-established dynamic aspect of nature requires attention to how proper-ties of chemical entities are maintained through time, and how they maintainintegrity during interaction. Failure to consider factors involving time (use ofsynchronic rather than diachronic approaches) is not acceptable (Humphrys2008, ‘997; Earley 2o12b).
1.2 Properties and Relations
Natural human languages funchon as f all items fall into one or the other oftwo great classes: subjects (substances, particulars, or individuals) and predicates (attributes or universals—including properties and relations). Aristotle’searly definition: “A substance.
.
. is that which is neither said ofa subject nor (is]in a subject” (Categories
, (, 13—14), Barnes 1984, 4) is similar to BertrandRussell’s characterization: “An ‘individual’ is anything that can be the subjectof an atomic proposition” (Russell’s “Introduction” in Whitehead and Russell1970, xix).
Russell considered that whatever can be ily asserted concerning an individ
ual (any predicate whatsoever) is a property (attribute) of that particular. Hila
Putnam (1969) pointed out that philosophers who use such broad understand
ings often run into difficulties that use of narrower properrconce?ts would
avoid. D. H. Mellor (2006) conceded real existence only to those properties
and relations that science discovers to be involved in causal laws and argued
that many generallyaccePt properties (including redness) do not exist—
because any causal rerlarity can be dealt with without recognizing them.
Chemists generally use a restricted notion of property which was described
by American chemist and philosopher Charles S. Peirce 1839_i9i4j_that is,
a prope is how a thing behaves, or would behave, in a specified operation (CP
8.o8).’ This usage exemplifies Peirce’s Pragmatic Maxim: “Consider what effects,
that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our
conception to have. Then our conception of these effects is the whole of our
conception of the object” (CP 5.402). We follow the usual practice of chemists
and use Peirce’s concept of property.
Properties filling either Mellor’s or Peirce’s property-concePts (including pow
ers, capacitieS rnlnerabilities, and affordances) are classed as dispositional prop
erties. NondispOsiti0n properties are designated as categorial or substantive
properties. Intrinsic properties are distinguished from stntctu rat properties
features of entities that depend on relationship(s). Relations involve two or more
individuals as retata. Some claim that many-place (polyadic) relations can be
reduced to single-place (monadic) properties. But Russell argued that un’m
metrical relations such as greater than cannot be reduced to monadic properties.
In the mid twentieth centu’r some held that all problems could be under
stood in terms of noncomPo5ite entities (elementa particles) with intrinsic
properties. An alternative view is that every apparentlyintrmflsic prope derives
from interaction of less extensive components—as the mass of the proton
mainly arises from the combination of its three component quarks, not from
their intrinsic masses (Dun, Fodor, ison,Hoelbliflg, Hoffmann, Katz, et al.
zooS). On the former view, intrinsic properties are prima and stt,cthral
(relational) properties secondary: on the alternative basis structural properties
are fundamental.
1.3 AlternativeS to the SubstanceAttribute Approach
Alfred North Whitehead held that: “All modern philosophy hinges round the
difficulty of describing the world in terms of subject and predicate substance
and quality, particular and universal” (Whitehead 1978,49). Whitehead rejected
Locke’s category of substance and asserted: “Actual entities’—also termed ‘ac
tual occasions—are the final real things of which the world is made up” (18).
Process for Whitehead is all of a single sort_self-creation of actual occasions.
• Paragraph zo8 of volume $ of the electronic version of The Collected Papers of Charlei Sanders
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‘Actual entities perish, but do not change; they are what they are” (35). ActualOCCasions are not substances_they come to be and, in so doing, perish.Donald W Mertz (1996, 2003) avoids the substance-prope distinction ina different way. Mertz’s “Instance Ontology” operates with a single ontologicalcategory—called property instance, state of affairs, or fact of relationship Byrecognition of intensiontypes (universals), Mertz’s approach qualifies as realism,Each state of affairs corresponds to unification of its relata, Gilbert Simondonrecommended that we should “seek to know the Individual through individua.tion rather than individuation through the individual” (Simondon 1964, 22).iitehead made the achievenjnt of indMdualitr by each actual occasion a focusof his system. Mertz does not deal with the process of individuatio;i
1.4 SubstrateBundle Debates
Locke admthed that the concept of substratum was “only a supposition of heknows not what support” of properties (1690, chapter XXIII, section 2): in anAppend to his Treatise, Hume (1739) reported: “I am sensible, that my account is very defective.’ In the end, Hume was as dissatisfied with his bundleapproach as Locke had been with his substratum theory: Present-day advocatesof either approach rarely express similar reservations.
Jiri Benovslcv (2008) examined several versions ofboth substrate and bundletheories_some involving fropes and others recognizing universals, some witha single identical unificationrelation for all objects, others with variable numbers of relata olyadicity), and still others with distinct unificationrelations foreach object. Benovs considered how proponents of each of these versionsdefended against objections and concluded that both substratum and bundletheories share a common central postulate—the concept that each object has auniing feature. (This is the substrate/bare particular or the compresence relationship.) He identifies these as theoretical eutities (items “individuated by theirtheoretical role”) and points out that all “play the same role in the same way” inall their applications_therefore they are “identical (metaphysically equivalent)”(183). He concludes that substratum and bundle theories are in brothers notenemies-_and that both are seriously deficient, since neither has clarified the unification that they both require. That unification remains a “something, he knowsnot what” as it was for Locke: both substrate and bundle approaches are still
“very defective” as Hume found his own theory to be.
1.5 A Proposed Principle of Unity for Bundles
David Robb (2005, 467) described an explicit search for a principle ofunity forproperties. A certain tennis-ball (called Alpha) figures in these discussions.Robb begins:
It’s hard to deny that there are natures or ways being How could there bebeing without a way of being? To be is to be some way or other. I’ll cl these waysproperties..
, Ordinary objects (chairs, trees, human beings, electrons, stars) . . are
merely bundles of properties. Not only must a being be some way or other. it is
exhausted by ways of being.
Robb holds that an object (such as Alpha) “is a unified, persisting, indepen
dent being” (468) but does not examine the basis of such unity, persistence,
and independence. Although lie considers that objects necessarily persist,
r Robb specifically states “I will not address diachronic unity here” (476). His
treatment is synchronic. Robb states: “Whether something counts as an object
may for the purposes of this paper be taken as a primitive fact about it” (468).
Elsewhere (Robb 2009) he expands on various aspects of notions of substanti
ality—but does not propose a criterion of what unifies an object. He holds that
parts of objects that are themselves objects are substantial parts: parts that are
properties (rather than objects) are qualitative parts. Each object has both sub
stantial and qualitative unity-_these are distinct, but “we should expect there
to be some systematic relations between them such that our choice of one
constrains our choice of the other” (474).
Robb declines to express an opinion as to what the principle of unity of sub
stantial parts might be since: “My concern here in defending the bundle theory
is only with the principle ofqualitative unity” Reuses David Armstrong’s
concept of a structural property: “a kind of complex property, one composed of
the properties of and, in most cases, relations among [an] object’s parts” (476).
Adding: “to say that certain substantial parts are exhaustive at a particular
mereological2 level means that those parts are all of an object’s parts at that
mereological level” he proposes a qualitative principle of unity:
(CU) F or any substantially complex object 0 and properties F and C, F and G are
qualitative parts of 0 1ff F and C are both structuied on the (exhaustive) substan
tial parts of 0 at some mereological level,
That is to say, if an object has parts that are themselves objects, then the proper
ties ofthe composite object are some combination of the properties of the parts—
providing that all the parts identified at a particular mereological level are taken
into account Those resultant object-properties may be regarded as parts of the
object, but they are parts in a qualitative sense that is different from the usual
(substantial) sense of parthood. Robb assumes that the properties of ordinary
objects derive directly and exclusively from the properties of their components.
The principle ofunity (CU) does not apply to simples—objects that have no
substantial parts. Robb presumes that simples exist and invokes the principle
that “ifno objects exist in their own rights then no objects exist at all” (485). Robb
proposes: “A simple object.. .just is a single, simple property” (486) and for
malizes that assertion as:
(SU) for any substantially simple object 0 and properties F and C: F and G are
qualitative parts of 0 if F and C are each identical with 0.
‘Mereology is defined as ‘the abstract study of the relations between parts and wholes” [Shorter
Oxford English Dictionary, Volume I. (1993). Oaford: Clarendon Press, 1747]. See section 3.1 of
this chapter
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Robb argues igorously that SU does not involve the category-mistake of confounding (adverbial) ways of being with (substantive) entities, but obseesthat if SU does involve a category-mistake then “it’s one that bundle theoristshave been making all along’ (486).
2 Properties of Chemical Systems
Some characteristics of chemical systems (called molecular properties) dependmainly on the characteristics of components of those systems together withhow those constituents are connected. In contrast spectroscopic properties involve transition between energy states of entities—with concomitant emissionor absorbtion of energy. Chemical properties involve interaction of substanceswith like or different others to bring about transition to alternative compositions—thereby producing new connectivities (three-dimensional arrangements)of elemental centers (“atoms”; Bader and Matta 2013).
2.1 Molecular Properties
In chemical entities, attractive forces (such as between unlike electricalcharges) pull components together; repulsive interactions (as between likecharges) drive constituents apart. As parts separate, attractive forces draw fragments together. Distances between components change continuously, but remain within limits—due to balance of attractive and repulsive interactions.Closure of relationships enables each chemical entity to retain self-identitythrough interactions.
Molecules adopt the spatial configuration with lowest potential energy thatis consistent with constraints which obtain. For dihydrogen, a minimum ofpotential energy occurs at a single internuclear distance (the H—H bond-length).More-complex chemical entities are described in multidimensional configuration space. Potential-energy minima in configuration space correspond tomore or less stable molecular structures: the minimum of lowest energy is theequilibrium structure (Earley 2o;2b). Vibrations around such structures occur,and are more vigorous at higher temperature. Stability corresponds to closureof relationships among components which leads to a minimum ofpotential energyfor a specific connectivity of elemental centers. The details of each such“potential-well” determine how each system interacts, and specifies manyproperties of the coherence, Closure of relationships of components is whataccounts for the coherence of diverse properties for each molecular substance.Such closure allows each molecule to make a characteristic dfference and sohave ontological significance (Earley 2008a, Ney 2009).The factors that determine the variation of potential-energy with internuclear distance for the dihydrogen molecule are well understood. Electrostaticattraction between negatively-charged electrons and positively charged protons, mutual repulsion of like-charged electrons (and protons), the fact thatthe internal energy of atoms and molecules is restricted to certain specificvalues (quantized), and the Pauli Exclusion Principle (which limits occupany
of each molecular energy-level to two electrons) are all major factors. For the
ydrogen molecule, theory-based (a pnori) calculations of molecular pro
perites_dissodlatton energy, equilibrium internuclear distance, rotational
moment 0f jea_agree well with experimentallY eterm ed values. Approx
imate calculations for more-compl molecules_usually involving parameters
estimated from experiments_yield approximate predictions of characteristics
of chemical molecules, even for some quite complicated ones,
Properties that depend only on the mass and/or volume of molecules derive
directiY from phenomena that
p0flleflergy ersus_internttcar distance
cuiwes describe. Certain (colligative) properties of solutions depend on the
number of solute units (molecules or ions) dissolved in a given volume of sol
vent, rather than on the properties of the individual molecules. Properties such
as the melting temperature of a solid, the boiling temperature of a liquid the
critical temperatrtre of a substance all depend on mutual interaction of mole
cules of a single type. Both colligative and phasechange properties might well
be grouped with molecular properties.
2,2 SpectroScoPic Properties
Like electronic energies vibrational and rotational energies are quantized.
possible energy-levels are separated more widely for electronic states, less
widely for vibrational states, and quite narrowlY for rotational states. Transition
from one energy level to another involves absorption or emission of energy. If
a dihydrogen molecule (H2) absorbs a photon of appropriate energy, a transi
tion from a lowerenetgY electronic level to a higherenegy electronic level
would occur, Once the system was in the upper level (with a longer equilib
rium-distance) vibrations and rotation could occur but sooner or later either a
photon would be emitted and the molecule would relax to the lower level, or
the molecule would spilt to produce energetically xcited hydrogen atoms-
Transitions between energy levels provide a way by which molecules interact
with the rest of the world while retaining integrity (for dihydrogen, by main
taining the H-H bond). Under usual conditions, some chemical coherences
persist indefinitely, others have short lifetimes, and many are evanescent.
ArgttablY persisting long enough to undergo rotation is the lower-limit of
molecular existence (Earley 1992).
The geometric structures of molecules and crystals partially determine
their spectra. Details of structure can often be inferred from spectral measure
ments. SpectroscoP15tudY of the energy absorbed or released when chemical
systems change from one energy level to another_accounts for much of the
effectiveness of modern chemical science.
2.3 Chemical Properties
Chemistty turns lessvaluable materials into morevaluable items. When materi
als are mixed, new substances appear and old ones vanish as component elemen
tary centers rearrange. Every reaction involves a decrease in free energy—a
lowering of potential for chemical reaction. Reaction continues, however
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reactions continue at equal rates.
Any given starting mixture conceivably could produce a variety of finalproducts. Principles governing alternative changes are easy to state: Applyingthem requires experience and skill, The two main considerations are thermodynamic stability and kinetics (speed). If all reactions occur rapidly, the finalstate will be the condition that has the lowest free energy—total energy decrease due to chemical bonding adjusted to take account of the complexity ofthe structures involved (less-complicated structures have an advantage overmore-complex ones). Every chemical change involves decrease in thermodynamic reaction-capacity of the system—reduction of free energy or chemicalpotential. Chemical reaction corresponds to transition between stable states—movement of a system from one potential-well to another, Chemical reactionscorrespond to production of new closures—every chemical process is abecoming (Earley 1998).
Transition from reactant to product potential-wells necessarily involves passage through higher-energy arrangements of components which are intermethate between the configurations of the starting materials and products. Stowerrates of chemical reaction involve traversing patterns corresponding to higherpotential-energy barriers between reactant and product potential-wells: fasterreactions involve lower barriers, For instance, change from the stable cisconformation of 1,2-dichioroethane (C2H6C17) to the equally-stable tratrsconfiguration of the same molecule occurs rapidly. The corresponding reactionof i,a-dichloroethylene (C2HCl) is slower because the stronger double bondbetween carbon centers resists twisting.It is a serious error to focus only on thermodynamic factors and to ignorekinetic (reaction-rate) considerations. Most chemically interesting reactions arecontrolled by kinetic influences, so that history must be taken into accountQuite usually, the product that results from a chemical change is not the thermodynamically most stable product but some higher-free-energy form(s)(Earley 2012b).
Rates of chemical reactions are usually discussed as ifintermediate “transition” states had real existence. This approach forms the basis of a myriad ofchemical explanations of widely varying sophistication. Eugene Wigner suggested that reaction-rate parameters should be computed directly from moleculardynamics, as a preferable alternative to the thermodynamics-related transition-state approach to understanding reaction rates (Jaffé, Kawai, Palacián, Yanguas,and Uzer 2005). Molecular-dynamics calculations can now compute the motionsof some tens of individual atoms during reaction. For instance, modeling ofthe isomerization of HCN to produce HNC (Ezra 2009) shows that quasi-periodic trajectories and multidimensional chaos exert significant influenceson chemical reactivity. The transition-state approach does not take account ofsuch effects: To the extent that they are important that approach may lead towrong conclusions.
Tynically chemical ieactions happen through several rather distinct sub-
processes which often imolve intermediates of significant stability. Such a
series of steps is called a recsctlon mechanism. The reaction rate for each such
mechanistic step is subject to many influences, generally different for each step.
$ometimes one step will be so much slower than the others that it will mainly
detefli1i1e the overall reaction rate but usually several reaction steps will be sig
nificant for determining the overall rate of reaction.
It sometimes happens that reaction-rates for a series of related reactions
follow the trend in thermodynamic driving-force (free energy) for the same
series—but there is no necessity for this to be the case. Reactions with highly
favorable free-energy changes may well be slow; reactions with low thermody
namic driving-force might be rapid. Which product (of the myriad possible in a
paCular case) results from a mixture of reactants is usually determined by
the relative rates ofmany competing reactwfls. Rarely does a collection ofstarting
materials generate a single product: usually several products occur in propor
tions which depend sensitively on environmental conditions. Large networks
of reactions (such as occur in biochemiS, astrochemistry, or geochemistry)
are governed by the relativelySimPle principles just summarized but each type
of reacti0nflet\Vo has additional special features.
2.4 Relative Onticity
Early in the twentieth century, a disagreement between physicists aacted at
tention (Atmanspacher and Primas 2003 301). Albert Einstein held: “Physics
is an attempt conceptually to grasp reality as it is thought independently of its
being obsewed.” In contrast, Niels Bohr warned: “it is wrong to think that the
task of physics is to find out how nature is. Physics concerns what we can say
about nature.” it became customary to distinguish scientific statements as
either ontotogicat or epmstemologicat. The former deal with how things really are:
the latter concern how things appear to be. EventuallY most scientists came to
assume that only the a priori calculations of quantum physics merited the on
tological designation. Admixture of a posterioti considerations was considered
to relegate a statement to mere epistemological status. The opinion that chem
ical propositions could not attain to ontological status became widespread: this
view still has adherents (e.g., Mcintyre 2007). But this clear position is subject
to Putnam’s objection:
Once we assume that there is, somehow fixed in advance, a single ‘real,’ a single
literal’ sense of est’—and, by the way, a single ‘literal’ sense of identi’0ne
which is cast in marble and cannot be either contracted or expanded without
defiling the statue of the god, ie are tlready wandering in Cloud Cuckoo Land.
(PUTNAM 2004. 84)
Chemists believe that they darify the real order otkings when they provide de
tailed accounts of the diverse chemical species with which they deal. But they
employ a multi-level system of entities (Earley 2003b)_theY use a relative
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slowly until a minimum of free energy is reached—at a condition of chemicalequilibrium—and no further net change occurs although forward and reverse
ao6 Metaphysical Issues
The distinction of epistemic and ontic descriptions can be applied to the entire
hierarchy of (perhaps partitily overlapping) domains leading from fundamental
particles in basic physics to chemistry and even to liting system in biology and
psychology. Onfic and epistemic descriphons are then considered as relative to
two (successive) domains in the hierarchy.
. .Wlule atoms and molecules are
epistemicafly’ described within the domains of basic physics they acquire ontic
significance within the domain of chemistry.., the central point of the concept
of relative ontici is that states and properties of a system which belong to an
epistemic description in a particular domain can be considered as belonging to
an ontologic description from the perspective of another domain.
(ATMAN5PAcHER AND P51MM 2003 31I)
3.1 Wholes and Parts
According to the dictionary definition given in note 2 any theory ofwholes and
parts is “a mereology.” However, the specific part-whole logical system that
Peter Simons (1987, 1) calls Classical Extensional Mereology (GEM) has influ
enced English-speaking philosophers so deeply that that ‘mereology’ often
refers exclusively to GEM. Three basic axioms of GEM (Lewis 1991, 74) are
Transitivity: If x is part of some part of y then x is part of y.
Unrestricted Compositioti: Whenever there are some things, there exists a
fusion of those things.
Uniqueness of Composition: It never happens that the same things have
two different fusions.
The first axiom is relatively non-controversial. The knob of a door in a house is
a part of the house. The second axiom seems troublesome, since it gives rise to
statements such as that of Willard V. Quine: “There is a physical object part of
which is a silver dollar now in my pocket and the rest of which is a temporal
segment of the Eiffel Tower through its third decade” (Quine 1976, 859).
However Quine also states:
Idenfication of an object from moment to moment is indeed on a par with iden
tifying an object from world to [possiblel world: both identifications are vacuous,
pending further directives The nouon of knowing who someone is, or what
Ruth Barcan Marms (1963) proposed a substitutjoii0t interetation of first-order logic: This inierpretanon does not require specification of a universe ofdiscourse in advance but rather admits
all mtities that flsie in imp statements, Her interpretation (also called ‘tuith-value logic”) shouldbe more appropriate for chemical inquinj than is the standard (‘objecthl”) logical approach.
(QuINE 1976, 863)
One can understand this as giving the axiom of unrestricted composition a
pragmatic interpretation: what sorts of items should be in a universe of dis
course depends on the purpose of the discussion—if it should be useful in
some particular inquiry, any grouping of items might properly be taken to
comprise a single unit On that interpretation, the principle of unrestricted
composition would be acceptable, but with an odd notion of existence.
The third axiom of CEM (uniqueness of composition) clearly is incompat
ible with chemical understanding. Normat butane, CH3CH2CHCH3, and iso-
butane (CH3)3CH, have quite distinct properties but identical atomic-level
constituents (G4H19). This is precisely what the third principle of GEM asserts
does not occur. CEM is clearly not appropriate for chemicat wholes and parts.
William Wimsatt identified “four conditions [that] seem separately necessary
and jointly sufficient for aggregativity or non-emergence”—the situation in which
the axioms of CEM might apply. One is absence of cooperative or anti-cooperative
interactions: any such nonlinearity would make CEM inapplicable. The other three
conditions require invariance of all system-properties under certain operations: (i)
rearranging the system parts, (2) decomposing the system into its parts and then
recombining the parts to reconstitute the system, and (3) subtracting parts of the
system or adding more similar parts. Ifoperations (I) or (2) result in any change—
or there is a quatitative change under operation (3)—then the system is not a mere
aggregation and CEM cannot apply. Wimsatt concludes: “It is rare indeed that all of
these conditions are met” (Wimsatt 2006, 675, emphasis in original).
Wimsatt developed a trichotomy in which aggregates (to which GEM may
apply) are clearly distinguished from composed systems, in which details of con
nectivity (in what ways components relate to each other) strongly influence fhe
characteristics of the system, and a third class is evolved systems—those that
have developed through historical selection processes so that no way of identi
fying component parts has priority. In such systems, there is no unambiguous
way to determine what the parts of the composite system are: investigations
carried out for diverse purposes will identify different items as parts of the
system. Investigators who prefer to deal with decomposable coherences avoid
such systems—but that does not show that they are either unimportant or un
interesting. Chemical systems are composed systems rather than aggregates:
Biological and ecological systems generally fall in the evolved-systems cate
gory. Since atoms of most chemical elements were generated by contingent
processes in exploding stars, chemical entities might also be properly regarded
(for some purposes) as evolved systems.
Philosophical discussions generally assume (e.g., Robb 2005, Vander Laan
2010), often implicitly (Armstrong 2010), that items do not change when they
become parts of wholes—so that there is no ambiguity in identifying which
individuals are the parts of a composite whole. Chemical and biological experi
ence clearly indicates that entities included as parts of compound individuals
onticity. Which levels of entities are to be employed in a discourse is decided
during the formulation of the discourse_not in advance, as many logical sys
tems assume,3
3 Coherence
something is, makes sense only in the light of the situation. It all depends on
what more specific question one may have had in mind,
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are greatly changed by their inclusion in such wholes, Items included in coher..
ences often (but not always) retain their individuality—but their properties in
the whole are generally not the same as the characteristics of similar items out
side such coherences.
Simons (1987) pointed out that the Polish logicians from whose work CEMderives had strong prior commitments to nominalism—the doctrine that onlyindividuals actually exist—and that therefore they eschewed recognition ofuni
versals (properties and relations). Contemporary nominalists (e.g., Lewis 199;)
also regard universals as no more than linguistic conveniences, For them, onlyparticulars really exist. In contrast, ante rem (or Platonic) realists—perhaps in
cluding David Armstrong (2010)—hold that properties and relations, although
they are not located in space or time, realty exist independently of (and in some
sense prior to) the individuals that constitute instances of those universals.
Several positions (jointly designated moderate or in rem realism) are interme
diate between nominalism and ante rem realism: they typically hold that proper
ties and relations are important—but they only exist as features ofindividuals. Kit
Fine (2006) and Kathrin Koslicki (2008) endorse the notion that arrangements
of components_structures_are essential to the coherence of objects, and
therefore structures should be considered proper parts of objects. There is an ur
gent need for formal development of alternative mereological systems1 that will
have wider applicability than GEM does (Uored 2010, Harré and Uored 2011).
David Vander Laan (2010, 135) reports that the question ‘“Under what con
ditions do some objects compose another?’ has increasingly been recognized
as a central question for the ontology of material objects.” This query (known
as “the composition question”) consists of two sub-questions:
i. How can several items fisnction as a single unit in causal interactions?
2. What characteristics must individuals have in order to constitute such a
causally- effective unit?
The first is the external (or epistemological) sub-question: the second, the
ontological sub-question,
3.2 Symmetries and Groups
Three of Wirnsatt’s four conditions for aggregativity involve invariance ofsystem
properties under a specfied operation. This characteristic of a system is called
‘A. \. Whitehead sketched our an alternative mereology even before GEM was developed
Simons 1987, 8i 86). Whitehead based his system on an insight that he later summarized as:
“However we fix a determinate entity, there is always a narrower determination of something
which is presupposed in our first choice, also there is always a udder determination into which
our first choice fades by transition beyond itself” (Whitehead 1967, 93). This can be stated moreformchy as:for every particularx there exists an entity y that extends over x. and there also xists anindhidual z that x extends ovev IXhitehead did not complete development of his mereological
system. but his basic approach seems more consistent with chemical practice and its resultsthan is GEM. Both Whitehead’s multi-level mereology and Ruth Barcan Marcus’ substitutionallogic can accommodate the importance ofpwposes in Scientific representation.
symmetry. Wimsatt’s conclusion can be rephrased as: GEM applies if the system
of interest involves neither cooperative or inhibitory interactions, and also is
symmetric with respect to all three of the operations, (i) rearranging constituent
parts, (2) disassembling and reassembling those fragments, and (3) adding
components similar to those already present, or subtracting some of the orig
inal parts. Systems to which alt four of these conditions apply are extremely rare.
Symmetry conditions such as Wimsatt invokes are at the center ofcurrently-
used tests for the identity of entities. Galileo Galilei’s seventeenth-century
research led to general and explicit acceptance of the uruformitarian doctrines
that physical laws are the same in all parts of the universe, that all times are
equivalent, and that no spatial direction is preferred. On this basis, physical
objects can properly be described at any specific time (past, present, or thture)
and using any convenient coordinate system (oriented in any direction). Since
Galileo also established that acceleration (rather than velocity) is what is im
portant, objects can be represented as moving with respect to an external ref
erence point at any constant velocity. (This is the Galilean principle ofrelativity.)
On this basis, the validity of a description would not change on alteration of the
single time specification, the three spatial coordinates, the three orientation
angles, or the three velocity components (boosts) .Any entity that is not changed
by any of these ten transformations (alone or in combination) is considered to
be a Galilean particle (Castellani 1998)—that is, such a coherence is properly
regarded as a single individual existent.
Each of the entities considered in cuirent particle-physics displays symme
tries (invariance under appropriate operations) that correspond to (represent)
one or another of certain mathematical objects called groups. A group is a spe
cial kind of set (a collection of elements) for which applying a stated procedure
(the group operation) to any two members of the group generates a member of
the group—and not something else. This closure requirement is a severe one:
Groups are rare among sets (Joseph E. Earley 2013).
The ten operations under which Galilean particles are symmetric (single
time-specification, three spatial coordinates, three orientation angles, and three
velocity components) constitute the defining operations of the Galilei Group,
designated G. Each of the many types of Galilean particles corresponds to a rep
resentation of G. Since all the component operations of G can be carried out to
greater or lesser degrees without restriction (like the rotations of a circle about its
center), G is a continuous group rather than a discontinuous or discrete group.
(Rotation ofa regular polygon around its center corresponds to a discrete group.)
3.3 Extensions of the Symmetry Concept
In 1929 Hermann Weyl revived a proposal he had made in 1918 that descrip
tions of electromagnetic systems would be unchanged by a gauge transforma
tion—an operation by which A, the phase5 of the wave function i/i, was changed
5The fraction (say, of the complete (360 1 oscillation completed at a given instant.
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In this way the apparent ‘arbitrariness’ formerly ascribed to the potential is now
understood as freedom to choose any value for the phase of a wave function
without affecting the equation, This is exactly what gauge invariance means.
(cAo 1988, 120)
By 1927 Wolfgang Pauli had rationalized Pieter Zeeman’s 1896 discovery that
magnetic fields split spectral lines, on the basis of the proposal that electrons
possessed intrinsic angular momentum (spin): he also explained the 1922
demonstration by Otto Stem and Walther Gerlach that magnetic fields splitbeams of silver atoms, by postulating that silver ions also had spin. In 1928
Paul Dirac rationalized the spins of the electron and of the silver ion by com
bining gauge transformations with Einstein’s Special Theory of Relativity’. The
Poincaré Group—the product of the ten operations that define the Galilei
group G and the four Lorentz transformations—defined each particle, as the
Galilei group had done in ordinary mechanics.
After the neutron (discovered in 1932) turned out to be nearly identical to
the proton (except for electrical charge), Eugene Wigner (1937) proposed that
the proton and neutron should be regarded as alternative energy states of a
single particle-type—resembling the two (+V2 and —Y2) spin-states of the elec
tron. He suggested the name isospin for whatever characteristic of these enti
ties might be analogous to election spin. Isospin, so conceived, does not have
units of angular momentum as electron spin does—the name is clearly meta
phorical. In 1954, after the detection of other subatomic particles, Chen Yang
and Robert Mills proposed that the proton, the neutron, and other hadrons
should be considered to be interrelated by gauge symmetries involving iso
topic spin (also called isospin or, preferably, isobanc spin) which could assume
values including V2, i, and 3/2. This approach predicted the existence of a
number of previously-unknown particles that subsequently were experimen
tally observed.
It turns out that the symmetries corresponding to the electronic spin and
isobaric spin are not continuous, as are direct coordinate transformations. For
instance, there are only two values of electronic spin f+Yz and —‘/2). The more-
complicated groups that replaced the Yang Mills group also have only a rather
small number of representations, corresponding to the proton and neutron and
to the several excited states (other hadrons) that derive from them. Since only
certain specific system-states fulfil the group requirements, the groups pertain







The Lorentz transfonnations for a body moving with constant velocity (v) in the x direction are:
z =z:y=yx =k(x—vt):t’ k(t—vx/c’),wherek)i s’/c’) 2aiidcisthevelocityof]ight.
Extensions and modifications of the Yang-Mills proposal (and also subse
quent experimental developments) eventually led to the current Standard
Model of Particle Physics fCothngham and Greenwood 2007)
which treats had-
tons as composed of spin one-half fermions held together by
bosons_vector
panides of unit spin that arise from quantization of gauge fields (as the photon,
the boson that carries electromagnetism, arises from
quantization of the elec
omagnetic gauge field).8 Spatiotemporal symmetries (such as those of spatial
rotation) are called external, global, or geomenic: Phase-syrnrneti in electrody
namics and isospin-symmeti are designated internal, local, or
dynamic: this
usage corresponds to a maior extension of the concept of symmetry.9
The principle that every individual corresponds to a representation of
a
mathematical group responds to the external
(epistemological) part of the
composition question: the requirement that operations which combine
mem
bers of groups always produce members of the group answers the internal
(onto-
logical) sub-question. Stability is achieved only when relationships internal to
each item demonstrate such closure that states of the system repeatedly
re
occur—so that the system persists through time. This restriction is severe.
Section 4 describes several ways in which that restriction may be
satisfied.
4.1 Closure Louis de Brogue
After the First World War Louis de Brogue (1892—1987) resumed his university
studies and collaborated with his older brother Maurice, an accomplished
phys
icist. In 1922, the brothers de Broglie confl;ed the astonishing report that
electrons produced by impact of X-rays on metals had velocities just as large as
the velocities of the electrons used to generate those X-rays. This was as if
throwing a log into a lake should cause one similar log (out ofmany on the other
side of the lake) to jump up with equal energy (de Brogue and de Brogue 1922).
At that time, theories of the internal strncture of atoms that had been devised
by Bohr and by Arnold Sommerfeld could adequately rationalize available data
on
the line spectra of atomic hydrogen and ionized helium—but only by making the
assumption that electrons within atoms are restricted to having only certain energy-
values. Those early versions of quantum mechanics (QM) could not explain: “why,
among the infinity of motions which an electron ought to be able to have in
the
atom according to classical concepts only certain ones were possible” (de Broglie
1965, 246). Louis de Brogue deduced from Einstein’s theory of relativity and early
versions of quantum theory that each material object (including electrons within
‘The Standard Model does not have a single theoretical basis but rather is a collection of ad hoc
sub-models (MacKinnon 2008).
Eugene Wigner remarked: “The concept of smet and inatianCe has been extended into
a
new area an area where its roots are much less dose to direct eierience and obseatiofl
than
in the classical area of space-time symmet-. .(\Vigner 1967, ii).
by an amount that differed in various locations (A = A(x))—and a corresponding
term was added to the electromagnetic potential f,.’ With respect to this transformation, Cao observed:
Varieties of Closure
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atoms) must have wave-properties. He wrote: “The fundamental idea ofthe theory
of the quantum is the impossibility of depicting an isolated quantity of energy
that is not accompanied by a certain frequency” (de Brogue 1972, 1316).
In a 1923 Comptes rendus note, Louis de Brogue proposed that each electron
had two characteristic frequencies, an intrinsic frequency associated with its
rest-mass, and a second frequency that pertained to a wave that moved in the
same direction as the electron. With respect to electrons moving on a closed
trajectory, he introduced the following postulate:
ft is atmost necessan1 to suppose that the trajectoiy of the electron will be stable
only f the hypotheticallo wave passing 0’ catches up with the electron in phase
with it: the wave of frequency v and speed c / has to be in resonance over the
length of the trajectory
(Dr BROGUE 1923A, 509).
That is to say, an atomic system would be stable (that atom would persist as a
unified entity) only f the extrinsic wave remains in phase with the internal
vibration of the electron corresponding to its intrinsic frequency. The extrinsic
wave was then called the phase wave.
In fulfilling this postulate, each possible arrangement of an atomic system
engenders another subsequent state of the system that also fulfills the criterion.
This feature insures that the system, as a coherent unit, persists through time.
The only f in the postulate (emphasized in the original French) identifies a
clear requirement that a specific relationship between multiple quantities
(phases of two vibrations in this case) must obtain in order for a composite
system to be stable. The essential novelty of Louis de Brogue’s contribution was
to provide a clear and specfrc criterion that served as a basis for understanding
why some energy-states of electrons in atoms were capable ofpersistence while
other apparentlyequivalen possibilities could not attain such longevity. On
the basis of this postulate, Louis de Broghe was able to derive the Bohr-Arnold
Sommerfeld criteria for the stable energy-states of the electron in the hydrogen
atom. This was a great triumph. In a second 1923 note, he predicted that (mate
rial) electron-beams would be diffracted as light-beams are (de Brogue r923b).
Early in 1927, two groups of experimentalists independently confirmed de
Brogue’s prediction of electron diffraction—validating a second major achieve
ment for him. On the basis of his 1924 doctoral thesis, Louis de Broglie re
ceived the 1929 Nobel Prize for Physics. Through Einstein’s mediation, that
thesis also had facilitated the 1925 development of Schrodinger’s wave equa
tion—from which the many impressive results of quantum mechanics flow.
However, even before Stockholm Nobel festivities celebrated de Broglie’s award,
his realistic but non-local pilot-wave interpretation of QM had been supplanted
(Bonk 1994) by the non-realistic but local Copenhagen Interpretation (CI). The
main proponents of CI were strongly influenced by anti-realistic philosophical
ideas current in postwar (Weimar) Germany (Cushing 1994).
°This replaces “ficfional as a translahon of the French fictive.
Closure of networks of relationships (Closure Louis de Brogue) is necessary
for persistence of stable things, including chemical entities, This requirement
has not been emphasized in past and cur-rent philosophical discussion of h
ow
properties cohere, but it does respond to the second (ontological) part of the
composition question: How is it that sever-al Xs can constitute a Y? Criteria
analogous to the one that de Brogue discovered provide the basis by which
each of the possible states of a system produces a subsequent state that has the
same characteristics. This suggests that it should be possible to interpret each
of those states as a representation of some mathematical group. Similar situa
tions should obtain for every persistent chemical entity.
42 Closure Henri Poincaré
Philosophic discussion of composite objects generally assumes that properties
of composites depend only (“supervene”) on the properties of components
(Armstrong 2010, 29—32)—the properties of the least-extensive level are held to
determine all properties. Whatever its strengths in other fields may be, this doc
ti-inc does not apply in chemistry. Chemical entities arise from and are sustained
by interactions among their constituents —and mainly derive their characteris
tics from those interactions, rather than from properties of the components.
Characteristics of dilute gases can sometimes be inferred from information
regarding component molecules—based on the approximation that each mol
ecule acts independently. However, when gases are cooled correlations of mo
lecular motion develop, first over short ranges then over longer distances.
Motions of individual molecules become interrelated—so that the properties
of the macroscopic sample cannot be inferred by mere addition (or other
straighifonvard combination) of the properties of the component molecules.
Similarly, the simple model that chemical reactions occur by elementary
steps—events that involve instantaneous collisions of pairs of molecules—
seldom is even approximately correct. Generally, in reactions of gaseous spe
cies “sticky” collisions produce resonances (transient aggregates) and give rise
to correlations among the properties of molecules. Reactions in condensed
media (e.g., fluid solutions) are even more subject to cooperative influences
than gas-phase reactions are.
In both cool-gas and chemical-reaction cases, as correlation increases appli
cation of fundamental theory rapidly becomes unwieldy and impracticable. At
certain pat ameter-values (singularities) computations become impossible in
principle—as computed quantifies go to infinity. In the late nineteenth century,
while dealing the motions of the planets in the solar system, Henri Poincaré
(1854—1912) encountered situations in which standard methods ofphysical mech
anics failed due to the presence of singularities. In such cases, when near singu
larities, he replaced variables with divergent series (asymptotic expansions). This
technique (Berry 1994) allowed otherwise intractable problems to be handled—
but it had unexpected consequences. Often, after the variable-replacement,
the equations that best described the situation changed discontinuously at the
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singularity. Poincaré found that beyond the singularity relatively simple
expressions—that emphasized contextually important features and suppressed
irrelevant detail—often applied. Similar situations occur in electrodynamics
Interaction of the charge of the electron with the vacuum complicates compu.
tation of the charge and mass of the electron from experimental data (Teller
1988)—but renormalization (a procedure related to the asymptotic expansion
method that Poincaré devised) makes a selfconsistent theory of electrodynamics
possible. Similar approaches facilitated adequate understanding of solid-liquid
gas phase changes, critical behavior for pure substances, and transitions be
tween ferromagnetic and paramagnetic behavior (Batterman 2011): analogous
techniques are also used in molecular-dynamics-based approaches to chemical
reaction kinetics (Jaffé, Kawai, Palacibn, Yanguas, and Uzer. 2005, 194).
The simpler description that asymptotic expansion yields at and after singu
larities typically has different semantics (another topology) than the fundamen
tal-level description that applied before the singularity. Properties of correlated
systems do not supervene on properties ofcomponents—they require quite new
and topologically-incommensurable descriptions (Atmanspacher, Amannn, and
Müller-Herold ‘999; Batterman oii; Bishop 2012; Bishop and Atmanspacher
2006; Primas 1998, 2000).
When cooperative interaction of units becomes dominant, situations ade
quately described by fundamental theories change into situations that require
approaches that use quite different sets of entities, and other kinds of relation
ships among entities than are used in the fundamental theories. Transition
between these diverse topologies of explanation may properly be regarded as
a second kind ofclosure (Closure Henri Poincart). Like Closure Louis de Broglie
discussed in the previous section, Closure Henri Poincaré vitiates assump
tions that properties of entities can adequately be understood on the basis of
descriptions based on properties of component parts. That sort of closure also
tinderlies the persistence and effectiveness of higher-level entities that result
from lower-level cooperativity.
This situation is well described by Hans Prirnas: “The task of higher-level
theory is not to approximate the fundamental theory but to represent new pat
terns of reality” (Primas 1998) Physics Nobel laureate Robert Laughlin argued
(2005) that aspects of fundamental physics resultfrom cooperative interactions.
4.3 Closure Ilya Prigogine
Investigation of the properties of networks of processes (such as intercon
nected chemical or biochemical reactions) is an active field oftwenty-first-century
science. Such studies show that modes ofdynamic closure determine the coher
ence of properties of important systems, including flames, hurricanes, biolog
ical organisms, ecologies, and human societies. Chemical systems conveniently
clarify fundamental principles of such coherences,
Networks of chemical processes operating in far-from-equilibrium condi
tions often give rise to oscillation ofconcentration of components. If the system
is closed, such repeated concentration-variation eventually dies out. However if
the system is open, so that reactants can continuously enter and products exit,
then oscillations may continue indefinitely. In stirred systems, chemical oscil
lations may be either gradual or sharp: In the latter case, immense numbers of
chemical ions or molecules undergo coordinated chemical change in a fraction
of a second, Such dynamic chemical coherences necessarily degrade chemical
energy and increase entropy (overall disorder). This type of organization is
called dissipative structure. Chemists—particularly Belgian physical chemist
Ilya Prigogine (1917—2003, Nobel Prize in Chemistry 1997)—have made major
contributions to our understanding of such coherent organization of processes
in far-from-equilibrium open systems (Prigogine ‘977, Kondepudi and Prigogine
1998, Earley 2o12a, Lombardi 2012).
Each chemical dissipative structure involves a reaction f or set of reactions)
that gets faster as it goes on—an autocatalytic process. The simplest example is
A + B —“ 2 B (where the rate of reaction is proportional to the product of con
centrations of A and of B). In this case, B is a direct autocatalyst. Many kinds of
interaction that facilitate coordinated or cooperative functioning produce indi
rect autocatalysis (e.g., Sugihara and Yao 2009). Systems that involve direct or
indirect autocatalysis tend to be unstable—they readily explode and disperse.
However, if such a system also involves one or more processes that suitably re
duce the autocatalysis (such as B + C — D) then the system may return to its
original condition, and even do so repeatedly, thereby generating continuing
oscillations—a type of long-term persistence (Earley 2003a).
When oscillations occur in open-system chemical systems, variations of
concentrations of several components can be followed often over long time
periods. Careful study of such time-series (along with relationships among
times-series for diverse components, and responses of the system to perturba
tions) yields information on the details of the chemical reactions underlying
the continuous oscillations. When concentrations of system-components vary
in a correlated way, the variation of one may cause the change in another, or
alternatively, both may independently depend on some third factor. Studies of
relationships among time-series may discriminate between such possibilities
if the system is followed for sufficiently long times (Sugihara, May, Ye, Hsieh,
Deyle, fogarty, and Munch 2012). In many cases, explicit mathematical mod
els of chemical mechanisms reproduce main features of observed time-series
(and/or illustrate important behaviors of dynamic coherences).
In each such open-system dynamic coherence, the rate of entropy-generation
in the presence of the coherence is greater than it would be in the absence of
the coherence-defining closure. Also, the effects of the coherence on other
items are quite diffbrent from effects of the same components but without the
closure. Therefore the system as a whole makes a difference. That coherence
must be counted as one of the items that comprise the world (Ney 2009,
Earley 2006)—that l5, the dissipative structure as awholehas ontological signif
icance. The effects of the structure are the sums of the effects of the compo
nents, but which components persist in the system depends on the details of the
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closure of the network of reactions. The closed network of relationships regu
lates the composition of the system. for example, the existence of biological
dissipative structures accounts for the production (and therefore the existence)
of high-energy molecular species such as sugars, proteins, and DNAs, but
those molecules are themselves components of the dissipative structures that
produce them, Components are influenced by the characteristics of the coher
ences which those same components constitute.
Networks of non-linear chemical processes share important characteristics
with other complex dynamic coherences, including biochemical oscillations,
cardiac rhythms, ecological developmental changes, and financial-market vari
ations, Closure 01 networks of processes is essential for all such persistent dy
namic coherences. We designate this as Closure fipa Prigogine.
4.4 Robustness of Biochemical Dissipative Structures
Surprisingly’, some chemical species that are involved in networks ofbiochemical
reactions somehow remain at quite constant concentrations for long periods, This
robustness ofconcentration occurs both in vitro and in vivo, and can be modeled in
siico. Robustness in a network facilitates incorporation of that coherent set of
relationships as a reliable component part of more-inclusive dynamic systems. A
remarkable theorem (Shinar and Feinberg 2010) clarifies what network character
istics are needed to generate the approximate concentration-robristhess that is ex
perimentally observed. Specific network properties provide necessary and
sufficient conditions for insuring long-term stability of some concentrations.
Robustness, considered the ability to continue to function in spite of both
internal and external fluctuations, occurs at an amazing variety of nested
biological levels. Each of the following illustrations of robustness is well
documented (Wagner 2005): The sequence of codons in RNA and DNA is in
sensitive to replication errors; the function of proteins does not depend on
point-mutations in codons; RNA secondary structure is immune to changes in
nucleotides; the spatial structitre and function of proteins does not depend on
the amino acid sequence of the protein; the expression function of a gene is
robust to mutations in regulatory regions; the outputs of metabolic pathways
are little influenced by changes in regulatory genes; genetic networks function
even when interactions among network genes alter; metabolic-network func
tion is not sensitive to elimination of specific chemical reactions from the net
work; development of phenotypic patterns persists even though component
genes vary; body-plans of organism survive modifications in embryonic devel
opment. Each of these achievements of robustness involves closures that are
themselves intricate combinations of simpler sorts of closure.
Propensity to engage in cooperative interactions is arguably the most salient
characteristic of human individuals. Many of the features of the various worlds
we all inhabit are institutional facts—objective realities that are held in being
by their widespread acceptance (Searle 2010). Human institutions (e.g., spe
cific languages and ways of living, as well as economic, political, and religious
systems) are all based on (usually unconscious) human cooperativity. In all
such cases, relationships among constituents must themselves be so interre
lated that coherences maintain definition and identity over time. In these cases,
system properties do not supervene on properties of constituents. Anthro
pologist Jacques Cauvin (2000) explored how prior changes in concepts and
social practices made possible initial development of agriculture, and thereby
grounded the flourishing of subsequent human cultures. We designate any
mode of interrelation of processes which makesfurther network-formation pos
sible as Closure Jacques Cauuin,
Marjorie Grene (1978, 17) observed: “We do not just have rationality or lan
guage or symbol systems as our portable property. We come to ourselves within
symbol systems. They have us as much as we have them,” Cauvin’s insight has
been developed by recent studies based on evolutionary network theory tArtan
and Henrich 2010, Richerson, Boyd, and Henrich 2010) that have clarified how
human agents are themselves shaped by relational networks—at the same time
are each of those networks has been created by the behaviors of such agents.
Louis de Broglie clarified (for his time) how coherence of electrons and
protons constitutes atoms. Henri Poincaré demonstrated how new kinds ofrela
tionship (novel topologies) result from cooperative interactions. Ilya Prigogine
clarified how far-from-equilibrium dynamic coherences persist in open systems
such as when interactions generate large-scale coherences. Jacques Cauvin
showed how conceptual innovations (influential institutional facts) made pos
sible the distinctive evolution of human societies. In each of these diverse
cases, the emergence of novel modes of effective functioning (properties)
depends on defining closures of relationships of components. There surely are
other significant modes of closure. Closure provides the basis for the origin of
novel centers of influence—and thereby grounds the ontological changes which
are brought about by cooperative interaction.
5 Structures and Propel-ties
5.1 The Structuralist Revival
Considerable attention has recently shifted to structuralist philosophical
approaches to scientific (especially microphysical) questions (e.g., Bokulich
and Bokulich 2011, Landry and Ricides 2012)11 In 1989 John Wonall pointed
out that although entities postulated by scientific theories do change over time,
structural aspects of theories tend to persist through stich ontologicat modifica
tions. He proposed that what we learn in scientific investigation is correct, but
that we learn only about structures—not about entities, This approach, called






4.5 Closure Jacques Cauvin
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Epistemological Structural Realism (ESR) claims that relationships are more
important than are the entities that are related, Others carried this reasoning
further and concluded that structure is not only all that we can know but also
that structure is all that exists to be known. Steven French (in French and
Ladyman 2011, 30), for instance, “dispenses with objects entirely.” This more-
radical view is called Ontological Structural Realism (OSR). However, the no
tion of structures of relationship which do not involve items that are related
(“relations without relata”) seems paradoxical.
Earlier suggestions of the philosophic importance of structures had specifi
cally focused on chemical problems. David Armstrong (1978, Vol. 2, 68—71)
recommended that “being a methane molecule” should be considered to involve
a structural universal (a multiply realizable polyadic relationship that neces
sarily involves “being carbon,” “being hydrogen,” and “being chemically bonded”
as correlative universals).
5.2 Are Any Properties Intrinsic?
Some versions of OSR consider that all properties of any entity are structurat
properties—characteristics that depend on relationships with other entities
within structures. This amounts to a denial that entities have intrinsic proper
ties—characteristics that they would possess if fully isolated so as to be inde
pendent of all relationships. Two recent moderate versions ofOSR provide for
intrinsic properties as well as relational ones—and (their adherents claim)
thus resolve the relationship-withoutirelata conundrum and introduce causal
necessity (modality) into structural realism (SR).
In one such proposal, Holger Lyre agrees that all properties are structural,
but holds that some structural properties are “structurally derived intrinsic
properties (invariants of structure)” (Lyre 2010, sec. 6). He had previously con
sidered the relationship between OSR and the symmetry-group (U(i)) which
applies to electromagnetism and concluded that, in pennutable theories,12 de
scription of objects as solely group-theoretically constituted “becomes mandatory.
For there we only have access to the objects as members ofequivalence-classes,
under those symmetry transformations which leave the physical properties in
variant” (Lyre 2004, 663). In order to establish that some structural properties
are intrinsic, Lyre points out: “An object may have its invariant properties ac
cording to the world’s structure, the structure comes equipped with such prop
erties” (Lyre 2012, T7o). Perhaps to allay suspicion that he might be advocating
ante rem Platonism, he insists: “The world structure must.., be an instantiated
structure” (Lyre 2012. 170).
In an alternative proposal designed to introduce causal necessity into SR,
Michael Esfeld advocates Causal Realism (CR). He initially proposed that all
‘Those which concern partc1es (such as protons) which cannot be distingviished from other
particles of the same sort.
properties are causal properties (powers”) and rejected the (characteristically
Humean) doctrine that some properties are categoriat—merely qualitative with
no relation to causality (Esfeld 2003). Subsequently, he conceded: “we no
longer take OSR—at least in the moderate version that we defend, recognizing
objects—to be opposed to the acknowledgement of the existence of intrinsic
properties, as long as such intrinsic properties do not amount to an intrinsic
identity of the objects” (Esfeld and Lam 2011, 155). He claims that structures (as
well as properties) must be causally efficacious:
Structures can be causally efficacious in the same sense as intrinsic properties of
events: as events can bring about effects in virtue of having certain intrinsic proper
ties, they can bring about effects in virtue of standing in certain relations with each
other so that it is the network of relations—that is, the structure as a whole—that
is causally efficacious.
(ESFELD 2012, sec. 3)
He further claims that: “In sum, ontic structural realism is suitable as a form
of scientific realism only if it commits itself to causal structure, that is to say,
only if the essence of the fundamental physical structures is taken to consist in
the power to produce certain effects” (Esfeld 2009, i88).
5.3 Can Structures Be Causes?
There are objections to the entire structural-realist project F. A. Muller claims
that proponents of structural realisms do not adequately specify the meaning of
structure—and that the two best-established formal definitions of structure do
not have the properties that structural realists require. He claims: “neither
set-theoretical nor category-theoretical notions of structure serve the needs of
structural realism” (Muller 2010, 399). Stathis Psillos, a persistent critic of SR,
argues that OSR incoherently requires that structures be both abstract (multiply
realizable) and concrete (causally efficacious)—but since structures (considered
as polyadic properties) are purely mathematical entities they cannot have causal
efficacy—and therefore structures do not have modal force (Psillos 2012).
Rom Harrt and E. H. Madden (1975) revived the moribund notion of causal
powers, but Harré (2002) urged members of the Critical Realist school of
social psychology (an approach based on Harré’s prior work) to cease ascribing
causal power to impotent fictions such as “the banking system.” Subsequently
Harrh (aooqb) identified the tendency toward reification (“substantialism”) as
lying at the root of the errors he decried—and even went so far as to assert:
“Structural models in the human sciences are heuristic models only—there
are no structures” (Harré 2009a, 138). This Neo-Thacherian dictum appears
to contrast strongly with some of Harré’s earlier statements, specifically:
“Structured groups, that is, collectives, are ontologically prior to individuals.
‘George Molnar (2003, 6o-8i) tried to account for “how these properties [powers] have an
object toward which they are oriented or directed’ and postulated physical intentionality, but did
not give a conuncmg account of it,
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Human beings are constituted as people by their interpersonal relations”
(Hand 1993, 34), and: “Forms of life are the contexts in which personal and
social identities are formed” (Harre 2009a, 142).
In his discussion of social causation Harrd identified two modes of causal
action—event causality and agent causality. In event causality some happening
activates a mechanism that engenders a subsequent result; in agent causality
some continuously existing and active being brings about consequences without
external stimulation (save, perhaps, removal of obstructions). Harré proposed
that detection of event causality requires identification of a mechanism that
connects an initiating occurrence with an ensuing result: Recognition of agent
causality demands location of one or more specific powerful particulars that act
continuously (unless that action is somehow blocked). Harré concluded that
only individual human persons qualify as causal agents in social psychology—
vague constructs such as the banking system certainly do not merit that desig
nation. Both of the modes of causality Harré identifies involve powerful
particulars (either events or continuants); neither of them implicates univer
sals (properties, relations, or structures) in causality. If, as Esfeld claims, the
validity of OSR depends on structures having causal power, then structuralists
need to respond to the objections of Muller, Psillos, and Harré by clarifying
how (or in what sense) structures may properly be considered causes.
6 Causes and Determinants
6.i Concepts of Causation
The word cause has several distinct meanings in standard English—it is poly
semic. The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (SOED) identifies four connota
tions of cause corresponding to: (I) agent, (2) reason, () lawsuit, and (4) social
movement. Chemists use cause to refer to both agents and reasons. In con
trast, philosophers generally recognize only the first (agent) meaning of cause
given in the SOED, and regard all other uses as suspect—or just wrong.
Ernan McMullin (i) quoted the section of Aristotle’s Physics (ip4b,
18—20) that introduces the four types of cause (material, formal, efficient, and
final)—”Knowledge is the object of our inquhy, and men do not think they
know a thing until they have grasped the ‘why’ of it (which is to grasp its pri
mary cause).” This definition appears to identify cause and reason. McMullin
concluded that what Aristotle meant by cause differs in important ways from
how most philosophers now understand that term.
Although Aristotle counted any adequate response to a why-question as a
cause (aitia), he also made a clear distinction between efficient causes (change-
initiating agents) and fo?7nal causes—arrangements necessary for an event to
occur. As Psillos (2012) points out, structures are formal: The objection that
structures cannot be causes seems related to the distinction between efficient
and formal causality. Robert Pasnau (2004) carefully described how, during
the rapid development and subsequent slow decline of medieval Scholastic
philosophy, the understanding of the Aristotelian concept of substantial form
(roughly equivalent to the modem notion of structure) gradually changed away
from its original (purely formal) Aristotelian meaning, and increasingly ac
quired overtones of efficient agency. Pasnau concluded that the further modi
fications in the usual philosophical understanding ofcause which subsequently
occurred should be interpreted as continuations of that trend.
With the success of Newtonian physics, only interactions similar to events
on billiard tables (where precisely determined impacts yielded exactly predict
able results) came to be considered as causally significant inteiactions, Impact
of impenetrable corpuscles became the paradigmatic causal process; efficient
causality took over the designation cause. Most philosophers relegated any
other factors that might be involved in answers to why-questions to subordi
nate status—or to oblivion.
6.2 Limits to Agency
Mario Bunge pointed out that:
Some of the grounds for the Renaissance redaction of causes to the causa effciens
were the following: (a) it ]the efficient cause] was, of all the four [Aristotelian
causes], the sole clearly conceived one; (b) hence it was mathematically express
ible; (c) it could be assigned an empirical correlate, namely an event (usually a
motion) producing another event (usually another motion) in accordance with
fixed rules...; (d) as a consequence, the efficient cause was controllable; more
over its control was regarded as leading to the harnessing of nature
(BUNGE 1959, 32)
However, although Bunge does “restrict the meaning of the term cause to effi
cient cause, or extrinsic motive agent, or external influence producing change”
(33), he also recognizes that “causation... is only one among several types of
determination; there are other types of lawful production, other levels of inter
connection” (30). He distinguishes between causes (effective agents—the how
of things) and reasons (rational explanations—the why of things), pointing out
that these two notions are often confounded: “The identity of explanation with
the disclosing of causes is even rooted in the Greek language, in which aition
and logos are almost interchangeable since both mean cause and reason. The
confusion of cause with reason, and that of effect with conseqtient, are, more
over, common in our everyday speech” (226—227))
Biologist Ernst Mayr—a founder of the modem synthesis in evolutionary
theory—urged (1961) that biologists clearly distinguish proximate causes from
ultimate causes. The ultimate causes of the long-distance migrations of certain
birds, for instance, are (in Mayr’s view) the historical explanations (largely in
terms of natural selection) that account for why those birds carry out such jour
neys: the proximate causes are whatever hormonal changes (or other internal
Bunge subsequently observed: “From the point of view of cognitive neuroscience, reasons for
acting are efficient causes” (Bunge 2050, 224)
I
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mechanisms) account for how that behavior-pattern works out in practice, in
Bunge’s terminology, Mayr’s ultimate causes are not causes but reasons; only
Mayr’s proximate causes would properly be designated causes (as current phi
losophers use that word).
It is now clear that most interesting biological systems do not fit Mayr’s recom
mendation nearly as well as seasonal bird migrations do. Avian flight patterns have
vanishingly small effects on the progression of the seasons—cause and effect are
quite distinct—but, in contrast, the vast majority of biological systems involve re
ciprocal (rather than unidirectional) causality, so that Mayr’s distinction does not
apply. In discussion ofthis point, Kevin Laland and his colleagues report: “When a
trait evolves through intersex-nal selection, the source of selection is itself an evolv
ing character. The peacock’s tail evolves through though the mating-preferences in
peahens and those preferences coevolve with the male trait” (Laland, Sterelny,
Odling-Smee, Hoppitt, and Tuler 2011, 1512). Whenever reciprocal determination
makes it impossible cleanly to distinguish causes from reasons, restricting cau
sality to efficient causes (as philosophers recommend) is not appropriate.
6.3 Peircean Determinants
T L. Short (2007, 105—107) observed that the narrowness of the contemporary
philosophic understanding ofcausation (a baleful influence, he says, of Hume’s
ghost) has unfortunate effects—but called attention to an understanding of
causality developed by Charles S. Peirce. Stephen Pratten (2009) sttggested
that Short’s interpretation of Peirce’s causal theory provided an adequate re
sponse to Harré’s conclusion that structures cannot be causes.
The interactions that classical mechanics deals with have time-reversal sy-m
metry: Videos of billiard-ball collisions look the same whether running forward
or backward, In contrast, many natural processes proceed in only one direction.
(The spark-induced explosion of a mixture of H2 and 07 loudly leads to rapid
production of HO: the reverse reaction is unobservable.) Peirce calls such uni
directional processes “finious;” Short suggests the designation “anisotropic;”
chemists call such changes “irreversible.’ Pierce held an alternate kind of causal
process obtains in irreversible processes—”that mode of bringing facts about
according to which a general description of result is made to come about, quite
irrespective ofany compulsion for it to come about in this or that particular way;
although the means may be adapted to the end” (C? 1.211). This corresponds to
understanding cause as reason rather than as agent—that is, to using the second
denotation of the Fnglish word cause given in the SOED, rather than the first.
Peirce considered that Darwin’s account of the origin of biological species
exemplifies this alternative mode of result-determination. Natural selection
gradually (and irreversibly) eliminates those characteristics of organisms
that are not suited to the environmental conditions that prevail. Such reduc
tion (culling) of possibilities eventually produces one particular determinate
result—which outcome is prothtced depends on the contingencies of the
culling rather than on the action of underlying agents.
There remains little doubt that the Darwinian theory indicates a real cause,
which tends to adapt animal and vegetable forms to their environment, A very
remarkable feature of it is that it shows how merely fortuitous variations of indi
viduals together with merely fortuitous mishaps to them would, under the action
of heredity, result, not in mere irregularity, nor even in a statistical constancy, but
in continual and indefinite progress toward a better adaptation of means to ends,
(a’ 7.395)
Natural selection works in such a way as to produce adaptation of life-forms to
their circumstances (Thompson 2012). This general aim “does not determine
in what particular way it is to be brought about, but only that the result shall
have a certain general character. The general result may be brought about at
one time in one way, and at another time in another way” (C? 1.211).
On this basis, Peirce considers that each effective selection-criterion is a gen
erat rather than a particutar (a universal rather than a substance). Each such
criterion might be called a controlling general—an outcome- determining univer
sal. By this means structures (closures of relationships that have the property of
engendering future versions of the same clostires) would have result-shaping
effects, although they are not agents. In other words, if a certain state-of-affairs
results from a prior selection on the basis of some criterion, that criterion (a uni
versal) is a determinant (a cause in a general sense) ofthat state of affairs, To the
extent that closure ofa network ofrelationships ofcomponents is a prerequisite
for the stability of entities, that closure (which corresponds to a structural uni
versal) is also a necessary determinant of the states of affairs that it engenders.
The key feature is that if an equivalent to selection accounts of the existence of a
structure, then the influence of that structure (as such) may properly be termed
a determinant—a cause, in a sense that is more general is usually recognized
by the dialect of the province of the philosophers.
6.4 Non-Agentive Determination in Oseltamivir-Resistant
Swine flu
Several experimental results have recently been reported that show how struc
tural features determine outcomes as reasons rather than as agents.
Since 1990, millions of people have been sickened by swine flu—infection
by the HiNi influenza virus, From its introduction in 1999 until recently the
drug oseltamivir (Tamiflu, Hoffman-La Roche) has been effective against swine
flu. However, during drug-testing, a mutation (named H274Y)15 made the
virus immune to oseltamivir—but also impaired infectivity of the virus and did
not reduce the drug’s effectiveness. In 2007 several oseltamwir-resistant strains
ofthe virus with no reduction in virulence appeared. Bloom, Gong, and Baltimore
(2010) found that two additional mutation&6 had occurred independently and
enabled the virus to tolerate subsequent H274Y mutation without loss of viru
lence. The first new mutation was ineffective: the second mutation increased
Tyrosine (Y) replaced histidine (H) at position 274 in the virus DNA.
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the effectiveness of the otherwise-innocuous first mutation: combination of the
mutations was result-determining. Such a combination (as a determinant of
the outcome) is not an efficient cause. It is a reason not an agent. Determinants
of this sort can be identified when some arrangements function while others
fail. Such pruning defines a result
Tenaillon, Rodriguez-Verdugo, Gaut, McDonald, Bennett, Long, and Cant
(2012) and Meyer, Dobias, Weitz, Barrick, Quick, and Lenski (2012) reported
other examples of non-agential determination. In each case a result depended
on actions of particulars but those actions did not detennine the result: Selection
constraints specified the outcome, Rather than actions of components deter
mining the outcome, constraints determined which components acted—and
thereby specified what actually happened.
6.5 Contextual Determination
Every macroscopic state of affairs involves myriads of microscopic and submi
croscopic components. In the absence of external constraints (so all compo
nents are independent) each sample would have an immense number of
equally-probable possible future states. But no real rystem is unconstrained. Every
sample has a history (usually unknown and untold) that specifies its current
context and limits the range of available futures (Barley 20121)). Theories that
apply at the level of micro-components provide necessary conditions for proper
ties of more-inclusive coherences—but they do not proc’ide sufficient conditions:
Sufficient conditions must be dealt with by less-fundamental approaches. An
open vat of nutritious broth quickly changes into a teeming mass of biological
organisms, but which specfic type(s) oforganism result depends on the particu
lar species that happen(s) happily to colonize that soup.
“The;-e are properties of the higher-level theories (chemistry and thermody
namics) for which the foil arsenal of the fundamental theories (quantum
mechanics and statistical mechanics) provide no sufficient conditions for their
derivation or definition” (Bishop and Atmanspacher 2006, 1755). By contextual
property emergence, upper-level properties derive from the context ofconstraints
of the system as well as from the underlying level which involves less-extensive
components. Upper-level constraints typically remove degeneracies that char
acterize lower-level situations and thus lead to stable states. “Necessary condi
tions due to the original topology of the basic description are not violated as the
new topology is consistent with (though not implied by) the original topology.”
Such constraints are contextual determinants.
The network of relationships that underlies and defines an emergent coher
ence corresponds to one or more structural universals. The problem of the mo
dality of structural realism arises from the concern that mathematical objects
(such as structural universals) should not directly have physical effects. In the
cases considered here each structural universal corresponds to the closure of a
network of relationships—a physical process that has consequences. Closure
of networks of interactions among components generally leads to situations
that persist and/or recur. This is how behavior-patterns (properties in Peirce’s
sense) of substances remain coherently related over time.
6.6 Ordinary Things
But what about ordinary entities, such as David Robb’s tennis ball Alpha (dis
cussed in section i.6, above)? How can we understand the coherence ofAlpha’s
properties? That tennis ball coheres and behaves as a unit because the many
billions of elemental centers (atoms) that make up that sphere adhere to each
other through rather stable chemical bonds—each one a closure of attractive
and repulsive forces that is protected from disruption by activation-barriers.
But why do those particular bonds exist rather than others? Why is Alpha small
and yellow rather than some other size and color?
The International Tennis Federation (ITF) defined the official diameter of a
regulation tennis ball as 65.41—68.58 mm (2.575—2.700 inches), and ruled that
balls must weigh between 56.o g and 59.4 g (1.975—2.095 ounces). Yellow and
white are the only tennis-ball colors that are approved by the United States
Tennis Association (USTA) and the ITF. Since 1972 most tennis balls have
been made in a specific fluorescent yellow color—because research showed
that balls of that color were more visible on television that those of any other
color. The properties of tennis ball Alpha depend on the well-understood phys
ical and chemical factors that determine how chemical bonds relate to each
other—but also on contingent historical, economic, and psychological factors
that influence decisions of the USTA and ITF committees that specified what
properties are necessary for a ball to qualify as a regulation tennis ball. In this
sense Alpha is as much an evolved system (in Wimsatt’s trichotomy) as is any
biological species or individual Pt oduction of tennis balls (what Peirce would
have called afinious process) is clearly much influenced by determinants of sev
eral types, whether or not philosophers would designate such factors as causes.
In Robb’s example, and in all other cases, closures of relationships of con
stituents—determining structural universals—serve as criteria for selection
among results of activities of powerful particulars. In each case, coherence at
any level influences and depends on both wider and narrower (more-inclusive
and less-inclusive) integrations. The characteristics of material objects that phi
losophers discuss depend on closures that involve chemical components—and
also on human decisions within more-or-less stable cultural integrations (insti
tutional facts).
Properties stay together in each chemical entity because networks of dynamic
relationships among components generate a closed set of subsequent states.
Each such closure depends on continuance of closures in its components, and
also may participate in (and be determined by) closures of more-inclusive rela
tionship-networks. Structures (polyadic relationships) determine specific out
comes, even though they are not themselves agents.
Throughout human evolution people have modified naturally occurring
materials to produce useful items. Major cultural advances occurred when
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chemical processes (cooking, baking of ceramics, ore-smelting, etc.) were first
used to improve natural resources. Arguably tin-bronze was the first artificial
material intentionally synthesized in order to produce speuftc properties imporiant
for more-inclusive coherences. In the third millennium oc, techniques for man
ufacture and use ofeffective bronze daggers spread (;emarkably rapidly) throughout
lands surrounding the Aegean Sea: “Just as every nation in the Levant need[ed]
tanks in the 1960S and 197os, so every man needed a dagger during the bronze
age” (Renfrew 2011, 320).
In our own culture, most of the items with which we deal are made of arti
ficial materials. from one point of view, behavioral characteristics of each such
item hang together because of chemical bonding: in a another sense, those
properties exist because each item is useful in some context—and that criterion
of utility motivated the designer, manufacturer and purchaser. On that basis,
every artifact which contains artificial materials is an evolved system in Wimsatt’s
trichotomy. Diachronic modes of thought must be used to understand all
items: synchromc methods—attempting to understand coherences in terms of
their current composition without attention to how those integrations came to
be—yield wrong conclusions.
Persistence of every entity depends on closure of relationships among its com
ponents (each part must be stable enough) and is also determined by higher-level
integrations ofwhich that entity is a component. Creative activity, some involv
ing human action, continually generates “new shapes of value which merge
into higher attainments of things beyond themselves” (Whitehead 1967, 94).
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